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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECLARATION OF BARNEY'S 25% 
OWNERSHIP IN STI CORPORATION IS A CONCLUSION OF LAW. 
Contrary to Barney's assertion, the trial court's statement of Barney's percent 
ownership in STI corporation is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. The Utah 
Supreme Court has long ago noted that, regardless of whether a trial court classifies a 
statement a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, if it states a party's legal rights the 
statement is "purely a conclusion of law." Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 186 P.2d 965, 969 
(Utah 1947). On the other hand, as this Court has noted, findings of fact are to "inform 
the parties about the mind ["analysis"] of the court" and "provide a basis on which an 
appellate court can review the judgment. Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum 
Investments, 766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the present case, just because the trial court referenced similar language in both 
its findings of fact and its conclusions of law, that fact cannot reduce a legal conclusion to 
a finding of fact. See State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1994) (appellate 
court refuses to regard trial court's legal conclusions as findings of fact even though so 
classified in the lower court decision.) 
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court first laid out its factual findings regarding 
Barney's purchases of stock, a bonus check never paid to Barney, and what it considered 
unfair benefits taken by Siddoway. (Findings, 1-28). In Finding no. 29, the trial court 
1 
reached its legal conclusion that Barney was thus entitled to 25% ownership in STI corp. 
Thereafter, the trial court entered the same conclusion as its first Conclusion of Law 
(Conclusions, no. 1).] The trial court's declaration of Barney's percent ownership 
constituted a decisive step from underlying facts to legal inferences from those facts, 
which court's recognize as conclusions of law. Sandall v. Hoskins, 137 P.2d 819, 822 
(Utah, 1943). Such a conclusion was also a statement of a Barney's legal rights and thus 
purely a conclusion of law. Duncan, 186 P.2d at 969. Hence, the appropriate standard of 
review is one of "correctness." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (FN3) (Utah 1991). 
II. MRS. BARNEY WAS NOT QUALIFIED BY EDUCATION, TRAINING OR 
EXPERIENCE TO PROVIDE EXPERT OPINION REGARDING THE 
NATURE OF THE BENEFITS RECEIVED BY SIDDOWAY. 
"The critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is whether that 
expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it." 
Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999) citing Wessel v. Erickson 
Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). It is clear that Mrs. Barney did not 
have the requisite knowledge to be able to assist the trial court to resolve the accounting 
issues presented by this case and the trial court erred in admitting and relying upon her 
opinion testimony. 
Although it is true that formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving 
1
 The trial court also stated in Conclusion no. 6, n[t]o the extent that the 
foregoing Findings of Fact or any of them constitute a Conclusion of Law, the same are 
incorporated herein and by this reference made a part hereof. . ." (Conclusions, no. 6). 
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expert testimony, the proffered expert must at least be shown to have some specialized 
training or experience in the relevant area beyond a layperson so that his or her opinion 
can be seen as reliable and based on more than mere speculation. Utah Rules of Evidence 
702. 
Simply because Mrs. Barney has been employed in positions that have required 
her to perform general accounting duties does not mean that she has the requisite 
experience and training to review and analyze corporate/accounting records to determine 
which benefits and expenditures were inappropriate. If such were the case, anyone who 
had run their own business, worked as an office manager or in an administrative position 
in an accounting department could have provided similar "expertise" to the issues 
presented by this case. Mrs. Barney's "qualifications" simply do not satisfy the minimum 
requirements of Rule 702. 
Mrs. Barney is not a Certified Public Accountant. She has an associate degree in 
accounting from a local junior college and has worked for several years as an office 
manager and before that a customer service agent. One of her former employers obtained 
a judgment against her for taking money from the company and exposing the company to 
liability because of her incompetent "accounting" services. 
Finally, while objectivity is not a requirement in expert witnesses, bias is ever a 
point for impeachment. Mrs. Barney is the Appellant's wife, with a complete interest in 
his potential damages. The fact of this bias should have called her objectivity into 
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question from the outset. 
The trial court's error in qualifying Mrs. Barney as an expert is analogous to a 
legal malpractice case where the plaintiff seeks to qualify as a legal expert an individual 
who has a degree from an un-accredited law school, has never taken or passed the state 
bar exam, has worked several years as a paralegal in a law office, but who was sued by a 
former law firm for exposing the firm to liability for dishonesty and incompetency, and is 
the spouse of the plaintiff. There can be no doubt that it would be an abuse of discretion 
to qualify such an individual to provide expert opinion on complex legal issues and the 
applicable standard of care. Nonetheless, this is tantamount to the ruling of the trial court 
in this case by admitting Mrs. Barney as an expert accounting and damages witness. 
The trial court abused it discretion in qualifying Mrs. Barney as an expert. This 
abuse of discretion constituted prejudicial error because without Mrs. Barney's testimony 
and exhibits there was no other specific evidence presented by Barney with regard to the 
alleged improper compensation and benefits received by Siddoway upon which the trial 
court could have relied to reach its decision. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING INTO EVIDENCE 
IMPROPER SUMMARIES BY MRS. BARNEY. 
As a general rule, an expert may not guess, speculate, or offer opinion testimony 
which is mere conjecture. State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 231 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, 
where an "expert" admits that his or her opinion is based upon speculation, it is proper to 
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strike the expert's opinion from the record. Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 
(Utah 1996). Mrs. Barney's opinions and conclusions were shown by her own testimony 
to be based on conjecture and speculation, and thus, the trial court erred in accepting her 
so-called "summaries" into evidence. 
As has been shown, Barney's attempt to qualify Kristi Barney as an expert witness 
with expertise sufficient to testify about STI corporate accounting or damage summaries 
in litigation was contrary to the facts presented to the trial court. Her incompetence as an 
accounting expert witness in this matter was matched only by the complete lack of 
credibility in her exhibits which, by her own testimony were selective, arbitrary and 
substantially unsupported (Transcript, pp. 302, 315, 316, 328, 340-41, 342, 397). 
A. The Trial Court's Reliance Upon Kristi Barney's Summaries Was a 
Prejudicial Error, 
When trial evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict without wrongfully 
admitted evidence, an error in admitting the evidence is prejudicial and a ruling which 
follows such evidence is prejudicial. See Sokol Crytal Products, Inc. v. DSC 
Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir. 1994). In making a "harmlessness" 
evaluation with regard to the admission of evidence, the court must consider the centrality 
of the evidence at issue and its prejudicial effect in the trial court's consideration. See 
Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 102 (1st Cir. 1997). 
Moreover, although several individual evidentiary errors might not, standing alone. 
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have affected a party's substantial rights, the court may find that the collective effect of 
multiple evidentiary errors in fact deprived the moving party of a fair trial. See Phoenix 
Associates III v. Stone. 60 F.3d 95, 105 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
In the present case, the trial transcript itself demonstrates very clearly that without 
reliance upon Kristi Barney's flawed testimony and improper summaries, the trial court 
would have had little or no basis for its finding that Barney was a 25% shareholder in STI 
corp. During cross-examination Mrs. Barney admitted that her conclusion that Siddoway 
had wrongfully received excess compensation and benefits was based on speculation. 
(See Appellant's Brief, statement of facts 35-41). Siddoway objected to the speculative 
nature of Mrs. Barney's testimony and summaries but was overruled each time. 
(Transcript, pp. 304, 307, 321, 323-324, 352, 361-365). 
The only relevant testimony offered to the trial court besides that of Siddoway and 
Mr. Okuda was Barney's, which amounted to a brief and bland description of his view of 
the company and his minor role in it. He offered no real testimony about improper 
benefits and only limited evidence as to a compensation agreement with Siddoway. 
Barney's claim that Siddoway admitted the unfair benefits (Appellee's brief, p. 22) 
is untrue. Siddoway repeatedly denied that Barney was ever entitled to an equal share of 
everything in the company, and while he acknowledged certain expenses, (i.e. key pad on 
his garage, fishing trip) the expenditures were shown to be justified in other testimony. 
(Transcript, pp. 342, 345). Thus, Kristi Barney's improper summaries were central to the 
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trial court's determination and their admission as evidence was prejudicial to Siddoway. 
and not "harmless error." 
B. Barney's Insurance Benefits Argument is Betrayed by Competent 
Testimony and the Trial Court's Findings. 
Arguing under the incorrect assumption that Barney, who, by the most generous 
count possible, purchased only a fraction of company stock, was entitled to a dollar-for-
dollar share of anything touched by Siddoway, Barney argues that Siddoway abused the 
benefits of insurance policies through the company. (Appellee's brief, pp. 20, 21 & 24.) 
This argument is fundamentally flawed, first because no credible evidence suggested that 
Barney was entitled to an equal and commensurate benefit at every level of company 
operation. Secondly, the trial court admitted that its review of insurance policies showed 
that it was administered according to "the agreement." (Findings, no. 33). 
Barney admitted to the trial court that the company paid his insurance premiums 
for approximately three years (Transcript, p. 214) until he and his wife chose to take 
advantage of another policy through his wife's employment instead. (Id.) He also recalled 
of at least one instance when the company paid medical costs for him over and above any 
insurance payment. (Transcript, p. 215). Kristi Barney's "summaries" make no mention 
of such payments or benefits. 
Kristi Barney testified that Barney was actually covered by a life insurance policy 
for a premium of $96.50 each month and that Mr. Siddoway was covered with a premium 
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of $252.80 each month-with a net difference of $156.30. (Transcript, pp. 312-313). The 
difference in value was thrown around by Barney as if Siddoway had derived an unfair 
benefit. But Siddoway had already testified that higher priced policies on him served as a 
less expensive insurance alternative which anticipated the higher cost of replacing his 
services to the company (as apposed to Barney's services) and he clarified the fact that 
the company-not his wife or him—would be paid in the event of a claim on that policy. 
(Transcript, p. 140). 
C. The Trial Court's Finding of Unfair Compensation to Mrs. Siddoway 
Goes Against the Only Competent Testimony on the Subject. 
Both Siddoway and Mr. Okuda, the company accountant, testified as to the 
valuable services rendered the company by Mrs. Siddoway (without other compensation) 
(Transcript, pp 144-145, 444). Barney offered nothing on the subject. Yet the trial court 
found that Siddoway had unfairly benefitted by having his wife's car paid for through the 
company. This finding could only be reached by ignoring the competent evidence offered 
on the subject which showed that Mrs. Siddoway ?s use of the company car was the only 
compensation she received for her valuable services to the company. (Transcript, pp. 144-
145). As an employee, Barney also received the benefits of a company vehicle, 
(Transcript, pp. 226-227) yet unlike Mrs. Siddoway, he was paid a salary for his work. 
The car should not have been considered an unfair benefit by the trial court, and without 
reference to Kristi Barney's improper "summaries'1, the trial court would have no basis 
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for having done so. 
D. Barney's Continued Reference to Payments for Legal Services are 
Irrelevant and Misleading. 
Barney attempts to make an issue of the fact that a company check paid for legal 
assistance to Mr. Siddoway in a prior divorce action. (Appellee's brief, p. 20). However, 
the record shows, at page 147, that the payment in question was made when Siddoway 
was the sole owner of the company and before Barney ever purchased stock. Therefore, 
references to any such payment are not only irrelevant but distractive to actual issues. 
Nonetheless, it is instructive to note that the trial court once again overruled Mr. 
Schmutz' objection on that point and allowed the testimony in. (Id.) 
E. The Trial Court's Position on Siddoway's Use of Jazz Tickets Was Not 
Based Upon Competent Evidence. 
The trial court found, and Barney continues to allege in his brief, impropriety in 
the way Mr. Siddoway, as president of the company, made use of company Jazz tickets. 
(Appellee's brief, p. 20). It should be noted, however, that without reference to and 
dependence upon the improper "summaries" supplied by Kristi Barney, the only evidence 
upon which the trial court could have relied with regard to Jazz tickets was Siddoway's 
testimony that: 1) the company had been ticket holders for more than 15 years 
(Transcript, p. 192); 2) that all employees used the tickets, including the Barneys 
(Transcript, p. 148); 3) that he (Siddoway) attended perhaps as many as 50% of the home 
games (Transcript, pp. 192-193); and 4) that as part of his job in business/client 
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development and advertising, the company benefitted significantly by him taking current 
and potential clients to Jazz games. (Transcript, pp. 192-193). 
Barney himself offered no testimony about use of Jazz tickets. However, Kristi 
Barney admitted going to Jazz games (Transcript, p. 353) and she admitted that her only 
basis for counting the Jazz tickets as an unfair benefit to Siddoway was the fact that 
Siddoway attended the games when she and her husband attended. (Transcript, p. 354). 
On the other hand, Mr. Okuda testified that company expenditures were proper 
(Transcript, p. 433) and that he never thought that Mr. Barney and Mr. Siddoway were to 
be compensated the same and that in fact, from his understanding of the operation and 
management of the company, he assumed that Mr. Siddoway would receive more for his 
extra duties in managing the company and for his majority ownership. (Transcript, p. 
453). 
Therefore, without reliance upon Kristi Barney's alleged "summaries" of improper 
benefits to Siddoway, the trial court had no valid basis for its position that Siddoway took 
improper benefits in his use of the Jazz tickets. The only proper evidence before the trial 
court on that point was testimony by Siddoway and Okuda, which explained both the use 
and distribution of Jazz tickets and dismantled Barney's repeated allegation of equal 
entitlement to every facet of a company in which he was an extreme minority 
shareholder. 
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F. Mrs. Barney's exhibits are not summaries within the meaning of Utah 
Rule of Evidence 1006. 
Barney's argument at page 23 and 24 of his brief misses the point with regard to 
Mrs. Barney's exhibits being improper summaries under Utah Rule of Evidence 1006. 
Obviously each of Mrs. Barney's exhibits does not need to summarize every business 
record relating to STI. However, common sense dictates that if Barney proffers a 
summary purporting to summarize checks and invoices for expenses of STI and/or 
Siddoway personally (See Barney's Trial Exhibit 14), all of the checks contained in STI's 
financial records should be included in the summary. Mrs. Barney did not review all of 
the checks contained in STI's financial records and only included in Exhibit 14 those 
items that she believed were personal expenses of Siddoway. (Transcript, pp. 302, 328). 
The fact that Siddoway had possession of the underlying documentation or that 
information missing from Mrs. Barney's exhibits was contained in exhibits presented by 
Siddoway does nothing to cure the deficiencies in Mrs. Barney's exhibits as suggested by 
Barney at pages 23-25 of his brief. Mrs. Barney's summaries were clearly improper 
under Rule 1006 and it was error for the trial court to admit them into evidence. 
G. The Trial Court erred in admitting Mrs. Barney's summaries as they 
violate the hearsay rule. 
For Kristi Barney's summaries to be admissible, they must qualify both as an 
exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence, governing the 
admission of business entries, and as a proper summary under Utah Rule of Evidence 
11 
1006. Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168, 1174; Trolley Square Assoc, v. Nielson, 
886 P.2d 61, 68 (Utah App. 1994). 
Barnev claims that Mrs. Barnev's summaries do not violate the hearsay rule 
<* * ml 
because they summarized documents prepared by Siddoway and kept in the ordinary 
course of business. (Appellee's Brief, p. 27). Barney's argument is without merit. It 
makes no difference that the records being summarized by Mrs. Barney were prepared in 
the ordinary course of business if the summaries were also not made in the ordinary 
course of business. Id. Mrs. Barney's exhibits clearly were not prepared in the ordinary 
course of business for STI as she was never an employee of STI and testified that the 
exhibits were prepared shortly before trial. 
Similar to the present case, in Trolley Square Associates, the appellate court 
reversed the trial courts admission of exhibits which were summaries of monthly rent 
payments, fees and insurance payments due the plaintiff as business records because the 
summaries were not records made at or near the time of the condition being recorded-the 
accrual of the indebtedness. Id. 
Likewise, in this case, the trial court's admission of Mrs. Barney's exhibits must be 
reversed. 
Barney also argues that even if the exhibits were not admitted there was other 
evidence presented upon which the trial court could have based its judgment against 
Siddoway for taking excessive benefits and compensation. (Appellee's Brief, p. 27). As 
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has already been shown above, the only competent evidence available to the trial court 
without Kristi Barney or her summaries does not support the trial court's finding that 
Siddoway received excess benefits and compensation in breach of the agreement between 
the parties. Therefore, the only evidence the trial court could have relied upon the reach 
its conclusion are the testimony and exhibits of Mrs. Barney. Indeed, the only evidence 
specifically mentioned as a basis fort the trial court's Findings of Fact are Mrs. Barney's 
exhibits and one of Siddoway's exhibits. (See trial court's Finding of Facts 28 and 31) 
Accordingly, the trial court's admission and reliance upon Mrs. Barney's exhibits was 
prejudicial error. 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SEVERAL ERRORS WITH REGARD 
TO THE ADMISSION OF THE SUMMARIES PREPARED BY MRS. 
BARNEY AND LIMITING DEFENDANT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION AND 
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY. 
Barney claims at page 28 of his Brief that the trial court properly denied 
Siddoway's pre-trial motion to exclude exhibits prepared by Mrs. Barney which were 
produced after the close of discovery and shortly before trial, because the accounting 
records relied upon by Mrs. Siddoway to create her exhibits were always in the 
possession of Siddoway and therefore he should have had an intimate knowledge of the 
records. 
It is true that the accounting records were in the possession of Siddoway, but this 
does not mitigate the prejudice imposed on Siddoway by the trial court's admission of the 
13 
Exhibits. Until Mrs. Barney produced her exhibits detailing what Barney claims were 
improper benefits taken from STI by Siddoway, Siddoway could not review the 
underlying documentation upon which Barney relied in an effort to rebut the summaries. 
Mrs. Barney had taken months reviewing records and creating her exhibits. The 
summaries were produced approximately a week prior to trial and after discovery had 
closed. As a result, Siddoway did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. 
Siddoway prior to trial regarding her damages exhibits, nor did Siddoway have sufficient 
time to review the exhibits and the underlying documentation in an effort to rebut Mrs. 
Barney's conclusions. 
The prejudicial effect of the trial court's ruling denying Siddoway's pre-trial 
motion to exclude Mrs. Barney's exhibits was compounded by the trial court's limitation 
and direction with regard to Siddoway's cross-examination of Mrs. Barney, specifically 
with regard to Exhibit 14 which allegedly reflects improper benefits taken by Siddoway 
and upon which the trial court relied to conclude that Barney was a 25% shareholder in 
STI. 
The record clearly shows that Siddoway was limited in his cross-examination of 
Mrs. Barney in several ways. First, Siddoway's counsel warned the trial court that his 
cross-examination of Mrs. Barney would necessarily be a laborious process because 
Siddoway had not been able to depose Mrs. Barney on the improper benefits allegedly 
taken by Siddoway as reflected in Mrs. Barney's exhibits because they were not produced 
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until shortly before trial. (Transcript, p. 348) 
The trial court responded several times that it didn't want Siddoway to cross 
examine Mrs. Barney in any great detail with regard to exhibit 14 because Siddoway 
could rebut the testimony with his own or that of Mr. Okuda. (Transcript, pp. 348, 
352,360 and 365). 
At page 360 of the transcript, the trial court interrupted the cross-examination of 
Mrs. Barney once again and after a discussion with Siddoway's counsel, stating "Don't 
use this witness to try and rebut that" (the lack of foundation and supporting 
documentation and the speculative nature of Mrs. Barney's conclusions in Exhibit 14) 
(Transcript, p. 364). The trial court concluded the discussion by stating "You don't 
demonstrate that (the lack of foundation and supporting documentation and the 
speculative nature of Mrs. Barney's conclusions in Exhibit 14) through this witness.... 
where you do that is with your own client or with Mr. Okuda" (Tr. p. 365) Siddoway's 
counsel then moved on to the next Exhibit as it was obvious the trial court would not 
entertain any further cross-examination of Mrs. Barney regarding the alleged improper 
benefits taken by Siddoway. 
Standing alone this may not have constituted harmless error if the trial court had, 
in fact, allowed Siddoway to rebut Mrs. Barney's testimony with his own testimony or 
that of Mr. Okuda. However, when Siddoway attempted to have Mr. Okuda rebut the 
testimony of Mrs. Barney with regard to information contained on Exhibit 14, the trial 
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court sustained Barney's objection that Mr. Okuda's testimony lacked foundation because 
he had not reviewed the underlying documentation (Transcript, pp. 445-449). Despite 
the trial court's earlier assurances (upon which Siddoway's counsel relied) that Siddoway 
would have an opportunity to present evidence through Mr. Okuda rebutting Mrs. 
Barney's testimony, the trial court thwarted Siddoway's efforts to do so. 
Further, the trial court improperly sustained Barney's foundational objection to 
Mr. Okuda's testimony. Barney stipulated that Mr. Okuda was qualified to provide 
expert opinion with regard to the accounting practices of STL (Transcript, p. 401). As an 
expert, Mr. Okuda should have been allowed to offer opinion testimony as to Mrs. 
Barney's classification of the expenditures on Exhibit 14 as personal to Mr. Siddoway or 
business expenses of STI even though he had not reviewed all of the underlying 
documentation. An expert can give opinion testimony based on facts and testimony 
presented during the trial. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). Siddoway 
should have been allowed to take Mr. Okuda through Mrs. Barney's Exhibits and based 
on the information contained therein, provided his opinion as to whether Mrs. Barney's 
classification of the benefits and expenditures was proper. It was error to deny Siddoway 
this opportunity. 
During the discussion between Siddoway's counsel and the trial court regarding 
this objection, the trial court was informed that Siddoway planned on reviewing the 
individual expenses contained on Mrs. Barney's exhibits to demonstrate that they were 
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business expenses and not personal benefits improperly taken by Siddoway. The trial 
court informed Siddoway's counsel that it did not want to go through that process as it 
had already come to a decision that Siddoway had in fact taken benefits in excess of what 
was the agreement between Siddoway and Barney. (Transcript, pp. 449-450 and 456-
457). Based on this discussion with trial court, Siddoway's counsel informed the trial 
court that he would not even attempt to rebut the individual entries on Mrs. Barney's 
exhibits during Mr. Siddoway"s direct examination. (Transcript, pp. 485-486). Based on 
this series of events, how can Barney argue that the trial court did not "limit or preclude 
Siddoway from presenting evidence he chose?" (Appellee's brief, p. 30). 
Plainly, these series of errors by the trial court amounted to prejudicial error 
against Siddoway under the cumulative error doctrine. Whitehead v. American Motors 
Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990). The trial court admitted into evidence damage 
exhibits from Mrs. Barney that had not been produced until approximately a week before 
trial so that Siddoway did not have sufficient time to perform discovery to rebut the 
information in the exhibits; and then the trial court limited Siddoway's cross-examination 
of Mrs. Barney, stating that Siddoway could rebut Mrs. Barney's testimony and exhibits 
with his own testimony and/or that of Mr. Okuda. When Siddoway attempted to do so the 
trial court would not allow it. 
Together these errors were prejudicial to Siddoway because there was no other 
"evidence" presented by Barney upon which the trial court could have relied to find 
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specific benefits taken by Siddoway that were in excess of the agreement between the 
parties which in turn the trial court used to find that Barney was a 25% shareholder in 
STI. 
V. BARNEY IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST AS THE 
DATE STI WAS DISSOLVED AND THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES 
COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED WITH CERTAINTY. 
In Utah, the award of pre-judgment interest in proper where the loss is fixed at a 
definite time and the interest can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. Coalville 
City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Utah Ct.App.1997). 
If the fact finder must determine the loss by using its best judgment as to the 
valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment interest is inappropriate. 
Shoreline Development, Inc., 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). 
In the instant case, the Court was correct in denying Barney's request for pre-
judgment interest because a definite time for the dissolution of STI was not established 
and the damages awarded Barney were determined subjectively by the Court rather than 
be a fixed standard of valuation. The trial court did not use a fixed standard of valuation 
to arrive at its conclusion that Barney was a 25% shareholder in STI. In the trial court's 
Finding of Fact Nos. 15, 16 and 17 it is concluded that up to December 31, 1994, Barney 
had paid $14,500.00 to obtain a 14.5% ownership in STI; that the remaining balance 
owed Barney when STI was dissolved was $5,130.00 which the trial court applied toward 
a stock purchase bringing Barney's total ownership interest in STI to 19.87%. 
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Then without any "fixed standard of valuation" or any indication as to specifically 
how the amount was determined, the trial court states that "Barney's share of the excess 
benefits taken by Siddoway far exceeds the $5,130.00 and therefore Barney has paid well 
in excess of $25,000.00 for his 25% interest in the corporation, STI, and is therefore a 
25% shareholder in STL" (Trial court's Finding of Fact No. 19). The trial court seems to 
have made an equitable decision that although it could not determine the specific numbers 
it found that Siddoway took some excess benefits to which Barney was entitled and 
therefore this amount would make up the difference for Barney's claimed 25% interest in 
STI. The trial court's finding that Barney was a 25% shareholder in STI served as the 
foundation upon which the damages against Siddoway were calculated. 
Because it is clear that the trial court "determined this loss by using its best 
judgment as to the valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment 
interest is inappropriate." Id. 
Further, the trial court was correct in denying Barney's request for pre-judgment 
interest because a definite time for the dissolution of STI was not established. In its 
Finding of Fact No. 20, the trial court simply states that STI was "effectively dissolved as 
of the end of February 1996 when the parties no longer worked together." The testimony 
of the parties regarding when STI was actually dissolved is even more ambiguous. 
Siddoway testified that sometime in February 1996 he and Barney had an argument at the 
STI office during which Siddoway told Barney that he did not work for STI any longer. 
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(Transcript, pp. 107-108) 
Barney testified however, that he continued to work for STI for a couple more 
weeks after this argument took place. (Transcript. 218-222). There was never a written 
dissolution agreement between the parties with a date certain nor can a date certain for the 
dissolution of STI be inferred from the evidence presented at trial 
In a case similar to the instant one involving the dissolution of a partnership, the 
Utah Supreme Court found that an award of prejudgment interest was improper because 
the plaintiff had not presented evidence of "specific date" when the partnership was 
dissolved. Cheves v. Williams, WL 701230 at p. 11, (Utah 1999). Since a specific date 
cannot be established in the this case for the dissolution of STI, Barney's request for 
prejudgment must be denied. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY CHOOSING 
NOT TO AWARD BARNEY DAMAGES FOR SALARY ALLEGEDLY 
TAKEN IN EXCESS BY SIDDOWAY 
Appellate courts review the trial court's decision to award damages under a 
standard which gives the trial court considerable discretion, and will not disturb its ruling 
absent an abuse of discretion. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1041 (Utah 
1995). Furthermore, because the adequacy of a damage award is a factual question, the 
appellate court will not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); In Re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 1996). 
In the instant case, Barney has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion 
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in deciding not to award Barney damages for excess salary allegedly taken by Siddoway. 
Exhibit 17, which Barney primarily relies upon as evidence of Siddoway's excess salary, 
was shown to be wholly unreliable through cross examination of Mrs. Barney who 
prepared Exhibit 17 and through whom Exhibit 17 was proffered. Accordingly, even if 
the trial court improperly relied upon Kristi Barney and her summaries for other findings, 
it is certainly not an abuse of discretion that the trial court refused to award Barney 
damages for Siddoway's alleged excess salary based on this evidence. 
During cross examination of Mrs. Barney it was revealed that she did not even 
know whether the yearly totals for Siddoway reflected on Exhibit 17 constituted salary or 
bonus (Transcript, pp. 378-379) nor did she know during which month in 1989 Barney 
began receiving a salary from STI (Transcript, pp. 380-381). 
Further, Barney testified that in 1993, when he discovered that Siddoway was 
receiving a higher monthly salary than him, the two of them reached an agreement that 
Barney would receive a raise and Barney was satisfied with the arrangement after that. 
(Transcript, pp. 241-242). 
Finally, although Siddoway testified that on occasion he received $200.00 to 
$300.00 more in monthly salary than Barney, he also testified that this was not contrary to 
their agreement and that Barney was aware of the salary that each of them was receiving. 
He also testified without contradiction that there were times when he was not paid but 
that Barney was-and that Barney never went without a paycheck. (Transcript, p. 168-169). 
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Siddoway. testified that the original agreement was that Siddoway and Barney would 
receive the same salary for the tile setting work they performed for STI. However, on 
occasion, Siddoway would receive extra salary for other duties that he performed for STI 
such as estimating and bookkeeping. (Transcript, pp. 33-34). Siddoway testified that 
Barney was aware of this arrangement and that they would both receive raises at different 
times based on the profitability of STI during a given time period. (Transcript, pp. 35-
41). 
Based on any or all of the following testimony and evidence, the trial court could 
have reasonably concluded that Barney had not carried his burden of proving that 
Siddoway had received excess salary from STI contrary to the parties' agreement. 
Accordingly, the trial court's decision not to award damages to Barney for the alleged 
excess salary taken by Siddoway was not an abuse of discretion and Barney's Cross-
Appeal must be denied. 
VII. BARNEY IS RAISING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THE 
ARGUMENT THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE 
ALLEGED EXCESS SALARY TAKEN BY SIDDOWAY FROM STL 
Barney admits in his Cross Appeal that, at trial, he argued that he should have 
received 25% of the excess salary received by Siddoway. Now, on appeal, Barney 
attempts to change his argument, claiming for the first time, that "in reality," he should 
have received the full amount of the alleged excess salary received by Siddoway plus 
interest in the amount of $42,025.00. (Cross Appeal, pp. 34). 
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Because Barney failed to present this argument to the trial court, he is precluded 
from raising this issue on appeal. Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 
850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993): State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985). As a 
result, Barney's Cross Appeal must fail. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erroneously concluded that Mr. Barney is entitled to 25% of the 
ownership of STI, and further erred in applying that percentage to the assets of the 
corporation in awarding Mr. Barney a judgment in the amount of $41,036.17. The 
judgment also erroneously includes 50% of a note receivable from Mr. Siddoway, which 
should correctly have been treated as an asset of the corporation. The court should have 
distributed 14.5% of the same to Mr. Barney. 
For the reasons set forth above, this court should reform the judgment to award a 
14.5% ownership interest in the assets of STI to Mr. Barney and award him judgment in 
the amount of $25,584.66. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand this matter for recalculation of damages based upon a 14.5% 
ownership of STI by Mr. Barney. 
Further, the Court should deny Barney's Cross Appeal seeking prejudgment 
interest and additional damages. Barney is not entitled to pre-judgment interest because 
the date STI was dissolved and the amount of damages could not be ascertained with 
certainty. Furthermore, despite its multiple errors, the trial court did not abuse its 
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discretion by choosing not to award Barney additional salary damages related to alleged 
unfair salary payments to Siddoway. Furthermore, Barney raises his salary argument for 
the first time on appeal and is therefore not entitled to relief 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Evan A. Sc 
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